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THE ROAD TO RECOVERY: THE THIRD CIRCUIT RECOGNIZES
THE IMPORTANCE OF REHABILITATIVE NEEDS DURING
SENTENCING IN UNITED STATES
v. SCHONEWOLF
MARISSA A. BOOTH*
“Circumstances of crimes vary. So do motives. And so do prospects for
rehabilitation. The number of imponderables makes it impossible
to sentence by formula and still sentence justly.”1
I. KEEP

IT

SIMPLE: AN INTRODUCTION

TO

REHABILITATION

IN

PRISON

One in two incarcerated persons struggle with substance abuse disorders and dependency.2 Of these inmates, many were under the influence
of narcotics while they committed the crime that led to their incarceration.3 One study found that about 15% of male and 30% of female inmates suffer from diagnosed mental illnesses.4 These figures are likely
conservative, as other studies have revealed that over half of inmates satisfy
the criteria for a mental illness.5
* J.D., 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.A., 2016,
University of Pittsburgh. This Casebrief is dedicated to my parents, Jim and
Marian Booth, and my brother, James Booth. I owe much of my success to your
unconditional love, continuous support, and steady encouragement. I would also
like the Villanova Law Review staff for all of their hard work, dedication, and
thoughtful feedback throughout the publication process.
1. See Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General, Address at Joint Sentencing Institute of the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Judicial Circuits (Oct. 12, 1961), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/10-12-1961.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y5SD-J8PC].
2. See Incarceration, Substance Abuse, and Addiction, THE CTR. FOR PRISONER
HEALTH & HUMAN RIGHTS, https://www.prisonerhealth.org/educational-resour
ces/factsheets-2/incarceration-substance-abuse-and-addiction/ [https://perma
.cc/GK8U-CUBJ] (last visited Jan. 17, 2019) (providing statistics on prevalence of
substance use disorders amongst inmates).
3. See id. (noting study in five cities showed 63% to 83% of defendants had
drugs in their system at time of arrest).
4. See Jailing People with Mental Illness, NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://
www.nami.org/learn-more/public-policy/jailing-people-with-mental-illness
[https://perma.cc/AH5E-NVDD] (last visited Jan. 17, 2019) (providing statistics
on presence of mental illnesses among inmates).
5. See Incarceration and Mental Health, THE CTR. FOR PRISONER HEALTH
& HUMAN RIGHTS, https://www.prisonerhealth.org/educational-resources/fact
sheets-2/incarceration-and-mental-health/ [https://perma.cc/GK8U-CUBJ] (last
visited Jan. 17, 2019) (noting statistics regarding mental illness among inmates).
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In addition to high percentages of mental illness and substance use
disorders, other concerns include the lack of formal education and vocational training available to citizens who later become incarcerated.6 Approximately 41% of federal and state inmates did not complete high
school or obtain their General Education Development, or GED.7 Moreover, many inmates struggled to maintain well-paying employment prior to
their incarceration, and upon release from prison, it is even harder to find
a job that pays well.8 This is especially disheartening because studies
demonstrate that job-training and employment reduce an inmate’s likelihood of reoffending.9
The connection between incarceration and the above-mentioned areas—mental health, education, and substance abuse—influences rehabilitation efforts.10 Rehabilitation is the theory that an individual’s criminal
behavior has an underlying cause, and if that cause is corrected, the individual’s criminal behavior will cease.11 For example, if an individual commits crimes to fund their drug addiction, the theory of rehabilitation
would assert that treating the underlying addiction would prevent the indi6. See Caroline Wolf Harlow, Education and Correctional Populations, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS: SPECIAL REP., https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R5JS-R3XY] (last revised Apr. 15, 2003) (reporting numerous
statistics regarding educational backgrounds of inmates); see also Adam Looney, 5
Facts About Prisoners and Work, Before and After Incarceration, BROOKINGS (Mar. 14,
2018) https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/03/14/5-facts-about-prisoners-and-work-before-and-after-incarceration/ [https://perma.cc/L4J2-ANPJ
(discussing employment trends of inmates before and after serving prison terms).
7. See Harlow, supra note 6 (reporting numerous statistics regarding educational backgrounds of inmates). Only 9.1% of state and 9.4% of federal inmates
earned their high school diploma outside of prison. See id. (explaining statistics on
high school graduation rates).
8. See Looney, supra note 6 (discussing employment trends of inmates before
and after serving prison terms).
9. See Jacob Reich, The Economic Impact of Prison Rehabilitation Programs, WHARTON U. OF PA. PUB. POL’Y INITIATIVE (Aug. 17, 2017), https://publicpolicy.wharton
.upenn.edu/live/news/2059-the-economic-impact-of-prison-rehabilitation/for-students/blog/news.php#_edn7 [https://perma.cc/6L7X-4RHA] (citing Grant
Duwe, An Outcome Evaluation of a Prison Work Release Program: Estimating Its Effects on
Recidivism, Employment, and Cost Avoidance, 26 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 531, 544 (Mar.
11, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1177/0887403414524590 [https://perma.cc/5RGBC23E]) (noting that job-training programs, specifically work release, decreased
rearrests by 16%, reconvictions by 14%, and new offense reincarceration by 17%).
Work release increased the risk of technical violations by approximately 78%. See
id. (noting increased technical violations).
10. For a discussion of areas in which courts and other members of the criminal justice system may try to focus their rehabilitation efforts, see supra notes 2–9
and accompanying text.
11. See generally Beth M. Huebner, Rehabilitation, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES,
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396607/obo9780195396607-0046.xml [https://perma.cc/7ZTU-SF4X] (last reviewed Aug. 1,
2014) (“Rehabilitation is a central goal of the correctional system. This goal rests
on the assumption that individuals can be treated and can return to a crime free
lifestyle.”).
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vidual from committing future crimes.12 Another example is that of individuals who commit crimes to support their family; in this case,
rehabilitation might mean providing specialized job training or helping
the individuals obtain their GEDs to increase the likelihood that they will
find a higher paying job.13
Because most inmates and offenders struggle with substance abuse
disorders, mental illness, or a lack of educational or vocational training,
judges, lawyers, and other actors in the legal system often focus on rehabilitation as the method to effectively lower the likelihood of recidivism.14
While rehabilitation occupies a central role in discussions of criminal justice reform it is not a new concept within the criminal justice system.15
Instead, rehabilitation has been a goal of punishment—along with deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation—since the creation of the system.16
Nevertheless, the popularity of rehabilitation has waxed and waned.17
Currently, the theory’s popularity is in a waxing phase, with prisons
offering a variety of programs designed to rehabilitate inmates.18 Specifically, prisons provide substance use programs, which often vary in inten12. See generally id. (discussing theory of rehabilitation).
13. See id. (discussing educational programming opportunities that may rehabilitate offenders).
14. For a discussion of the prevalence of offender mental illness and substance use disorder, see supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of inmate educational and vocational concerns, see supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text.
15. See Michelle S. Phelps, Rehabilitation in the Punitive Era: The Gap Between
Rhetoric and Reality in U.S. Prison Programs, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1, 1 (2011) (noting
rehabilitation’s varying degrees of popularity over time).
16. See id.; see also Jennifer Marson, The History of Punishment: What Works for
State Crime?, 7 THE HILLTOP REV. 19 (2015) (outlining history of purposes of punishment). The theory of incapacitation is simple: if offenders are physically moved
(i.e., incarcerated) away from society, they cannot reoffend. See Rebecca Bernstein, Addressing Transgressions: Types of Criminal Punishment, POINT PARK U. (Nov.
26, 2016), https://online.pointpark.edu/criminal-justice/types-of-criminal-punishment/ [https://perma.cc/5DLN-X7YE] (discussing theory of incapacitation). Deterrence is often split up into two subcategories: specific and general. See id.
(recognizing different types of deterrence). General deterrence intends to dissuade other criminals from committing similar crimes. See id. (providing example
of general deterrence). For example, sentencing one bank robber harshly may
deter other bank robbers. See id. (illustrating concept of general deterrence). Specific deterrence intends to deter one particular offender from committing future
crimes. See id. (providing example of specific deterrence). Retribution is essentially the notion that the offender will get his or her just desserts. See id. (clarifying
that retribution is rooted in societal satisfaction). In other words, it allows society
to feel as though offenders receive the punishments they deserve. See id. (explaining concept of retribution).
17. See Phelps, supra note 15, at 3–4 (providing timeline of increasing and
decreasing popularity of rehabilitative model); see also Albert W. Alschuler, The
Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some
Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2003) (detailing changes in purposes
of punishment over time).
18. For a discussion of some of the different types of rehabilitative programs
prisons offer, see infra notes 19–29 and accompanying text.
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sity.19 Drug abuse education classes are less intense; they are designed to
teach inmates about substance abuse and identify the inmates who may
need additional programming.20 Prisons may also offer two types of drug
abuse treatment programs: residential and non-residential.21 In residential drug abuse programs (RDAP), inmates live separately from general
population for approximately nine months.22 RDAPs are the most intensive program because participants live separately from other inmates and
half of each day consists of programming.23 Non-residential drug abuse
treatment is less intense than the RDAP and typically lasts approximately
twelve weeks and involves cognitive-behavioral therapy conducted in a
group setting.24 Many prisons also have programs for inmates who have
mental health concerns, including group counseling, crisis intervention,
and mental health units.25
In addition to the typical drug, alcohol, and mental health programs
prisons offer, most prisons also offer educational and vocational programs.26 Specifically, prisons may offer basic literacy classes, GED classes,
19. See Substance Abuse Treatment, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop
.gov/inmates/custody_and_care/substance_abuse_treatment.jsp [https://perma
.cc/N7BZ-LRUV] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (noting different intensity of substance abuse treatment programs depending on current state of offender’s
addiction).
20. See id. (discussing drug abuse education classes within prisons).
21. See id. (outlining types of drug abuse treatment programs).
22. See id. (outlining residential drug abuse program). Inmates in this program have two halves to their day: half for intensive programming in the community and the other half for educational or vocational activities. See id. (specifying
what standard day for inmate in residential drug abuse program would look like).
Importantly, the residential drug abuse program has been tested as follows:
The Bureau and National Institute on Drug Abuse combined funding
and expertise to conduct a rigorous analysis of the Bureau’s RDAP. Research findings demonstrated that RDAP participants are significantly less
likely to recidivate and less likely to relapse to drug use than non-participants. The studies also suggest that the Bureau’s RDAPs make a significant difference in the lives of offenders following their release from
custody and return to the community.
See id. (outlining both process for and findings of study).
23. See id. (elaborating on what residential drug abuse programs involve).
24. See id. (discussing specifics of nonresidential drug abuse treatment). Nonresidential drug abuse treatment is designed for offenders who have short
sentences, who either may not qualify for or are waiting to begin the residential
drug abuse treatment program, are transitioning to the community, or have had a
positive urinalysis test. See id. (describing type of inmates who would benefit most
from nonresidential drug abuse treatment program). The curriculum is meant to
address criminal lifestyles and build rational thinking and communication skills
while helping inmates adjust to prison life. See id. (stating goals of curriculum).
25. See Basic Mental Health Services, NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE,
https://www.ncchc.org/spotlight-on-the-standards-24-3 [https://perma.cc/8ENC9RHP] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (providing guidelines for ensuring mental health
services within prisons adequately address concerns of inmates).
26. See Reich, supra note 9 (analyzing economic impact of education and jobtraining programs within prisons). Educational program opportunities within prisons and jails vary greatly from place to place. See FAQ: Prison Educational Programs:
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and college-level programs.27 Additionally, many prisons offer work release, which allows inmates to work in the community during the day and
return to the prison at night.28
Because many offenders and inmates require treatment and programming, it seems prudent for courts to consider a defendant’s rehabilitation
when imposing a sentence.29 Nevertheless, the laws in some jurisdictions
preclude judges from even mentioning a defendant’s rehabilitative needs
or the possibility of rehabilitation at sentencing.30 This harsh shift away
from considering rehabilitation developed slowly over several decades.31
In the 1980s, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act (the
Act).32 Under the Act, a judge must consider multiple factors to deterWhich Educational Programs Are Available to Prisoners?, PRISON FELLOWSHIP, https://
www.prisonfellowship.org/resources/training-resources/in-prison/faq-prison-educational-programs/ [https://perma.cc/PHT2-KAMX] (last visited Jan. 18, 2019)
(discussing educational opportunities within prisons). Many prisons offer GED
classes for inmates. See id. (noting availability of GED classes). If an inmate has
already obtained their high school diploma or GED, some correctional facilities
have contracts with colleges and universities that enable inmates to take collegelevel courses. See id. (mentioning availability of college-level courses). Other educational opportunities include life skills courses. See id. (explaining availability of
other education courses). Among other things, these courses are designed to help
prisoners control their anger, set and achieve goals, and develop healthy relationships. See id. (discussing purposes of life skills classes). Moreover, inmates can and
are often encouraged to participate in various twelve-step programs. See id. (noting
availability of rehabilitative process programs). These twelve-step programs include Celebrate Recovery and Narcotics Anonymous. See id. (specifying some
twelve-step programs). Additionally, many prisons offer parenting classes. See Education Programs, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_
and_care/education.jsp [https://perma.cc/PLQ9-P4FU] (last visited Jan. 18,
2019) (outlining educational programs within federal prisons). These classes allow inmates to develop their parenting skills while serving their prison sentence.
See id. (noting benefits of parenting classes). Importantly, however, not every inmate may participate in these programs. See FAQ: Prison Educational Programs:
Which Educational Programs are Available to Prisoners?, supra (listing qualifications to
become enrolled in certain prison programs). In some cases, before inmates can
participate, they must obtain approval from the prison administration, take and
pass entrance exams, and pay full or partial tuition. See id. (providing examples of
requirements inmates must satisfy before enrolling in certain programs).
27. See FAQ: Prison Educational Programs: Which Educational Programs are Available to Prisoners?, supra note 26 (recognizing many prisons offer GED courses and
some prisons offer college-level programs).
28. See Reich, supra note 9 (discussing logistics of how work release programs
function and impact of such programs on inmates).
29. See id.
30. For a discussion of circuits that preclude courts from mentioning and
considering rehabilitation at sentencing, see infra notes 67–90 and accompanying
text.
31. See Phelps, supra note 15 (outlining history and trends of rehabilitation as
purpose of punishment within criminal justice system).
32. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2018) (listing factors for court to consider
when imposing sentence). The Act created the United States Sentencing Commission and outlined a new sentencing structure. See H.R. 5773, 98th Congress (19831984) (summarizing contents of the Act).
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mine an appropriate sentence, including retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and the defendant’s need for “educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment . . . .”33 Despite the Act’s
requirement to consider “correctional treatment,” another federal statute
precludes courts from ordering imprisonment as a “means of promoting
correction and rehabilitation.”34 Because these two statutes are seemingly
inconsistent, they sparked a debate regarding the role of rehabilitation at
sentencing.35
In 2011, in Tapia v. United States,36 the United States Supreme Court
spoke on the issue, holding that the Act prevents federal judges from imposing a sentence to further a defendant’s general rehabilitation.37 Nevertheless, the Tapia Court’s holding did not wholly resolve whether a
sentencing judge may consider a defendant’s rehabilitative needs when
fashioning an appropriate sentence.38 Instead, the Tapia decision led to a
federal circuit split because it changed the focus of the discussion.39
Following Tapia, circuit courts began considering the extent to which
a sentencing court may consider a defendant’s rehabilitative needs without violating the Tapia holding.40 The Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits held that any consideration of rehabilitation at sentencing
violates Tapia.41 In contrast, the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Eighth Circuits held that courts can consider rehabilitation as long as it is
not the determinative factor for the length of the sentence.42 Recently, in
33. See § 3553(a)(2) (discussing factors courts should consider in imposing
sentences).
34. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2018) (stating courts should not sentence offenders to prison to promote rehabilitation).
35. See generally Matt J. Gornick, Finding “Tapia Error”: How Circuit Courts Have
Misread Tapia v. United States and Shortchanged the Penological Goals of the Sentencing
Reform Act, 69 VAND. L. REV. 845, 860 (2016) (recognizing confusion created
amongst circuits following Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011)).
36. 564 U.S. 319 (2011).
37. See id. at 335 (“As we have held, a court may not impose or lengthen a
prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation.”).
38. For a discussion of the circuit split that developed following the Tapia
decision which demonstrates the need for further resolve on the issue, see infra
notes 67–85 and accompanying text.
39. See Gornick, supra note 35, at 856–57 (outlining different approaches for
analyzing Tapia challenges).
40. See id. (noting dilemmas among circuit courts).
41. See also United States v. Thornton, 846 F.3d 1110, 1119 (10th Cir. 2017)
(precluding courts from considering rehabilitation); United States v. Spann, 757
F.3d 674, 675 (7th Cir. 2014) (applying strict test that precludes any consideration
of rehabilitation at sentencing); United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1310
(11th Cir. 2014) (holding courts cannot consider rehabilitation during sentencing). See generally United States v. Joseph, 716 F.3d 1273, 1280–81 (9th Cir. 2013)
(applying strict standard for Tapia challenges).
42. See United States v. Del Valle-Rodriquez, 761 F.3d 171, 175 (1st Cir. 2014)
(holding district court did not err in considering rehabilitation when imposing
sentence); see also United States v. Lifshitz, 714 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2013) (stat-
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United States v. Schonewolf,43 the Third Circuit weighed in on the issue, joining the latter circuits and holding courts may consider rehabilitation at
sentencing.44
This Note analyzes the Third Circuit’s holding in Schonewolf and ultimately concludes that although the Third Circuit’s holding is consistent
with Tapia, this area of law requires further reform to prevent future confusion and disagreement amongst courts.45 Part II summarizes relevant
statutes and cases, outlining the justifications courts have utilized in determining the reach of Tapia.46 Part III describes the facts and procedure
giving rise to the decision in United States v. Schonewolf.47 Part IV outlines
the Third Circuit’s approach in determining that courts can consider a
defendant’s rehabilitative needs when imposing a particular sentence.48
Part V examines the Third Circuit’s legal analysis of Tapia, and also discusses issues surrounding Tapia challenges.49 Finally, Part VI analyzes the
likely impact of the Third Circuit’s decision on the extent to which a court
can consider a defendant’s rehabilitative needs at sentencing.50
ing district court did not err in considering treatment when primary considerations in sentencing are promoting respect for law and protecting public interest);
United States v. Garza, 706 F.3d 655, 657 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding courts may
consider rehabilitation when considering location or treatment options but not
when considering lengthening inmate’s sentence); United States v. Deen, 706 F.3d
760, 768–69 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting courts may consider rehabilitation when recommending treatment or location options but not when considering lengthening
defendant’s sentence); United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 200–02 (4th Cir.
2012) (holding court did not err by basing sentence on “egregious breach of
trust”); United States v. Replogle, 678 F.3d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 2012) (commenting
district courts may consider “educational or vocational training, medical care, or
other correctional treatment” during sentencing).
43. 905 F.3d 683 (3d Cir. 2018).
44. See id. (adopting approach that allows courts to discuss rehabilitation
when imposing sentences).
45. Compare United States v. Tapia, 564 U.S. 319 (2011) (holding courts may
not impose or lengthen a sentence based on defendant’s rehabilitative needs), with
Schonewolf, 905 F.3d 683 (concluding sentencing court’s decision was not unconstitutionally based on rehabilitation). For a further discussion of the current disagreement among circuits, see infra notes 67–85 and accompanying text. For a
discussion on suggested ways for the court to simplify the issue and lower the defendant’s burden, see infra notes 157–87 and accompanying text.
46. For a further discussion of the development of sentencing jurisprudence
as it relates to the consideration of rehabilitation, see infra notes 52–90 and accompanying text.
47. For a further discussion of the facts, procedural history, and holding in
Schonewolf, see infra notes 91–121 and accompanying text.
48. For a narrative analysis of the Schonewolf decision, see infra notes 122–50
and accompanying text.
49. For a critical analysis of the Schonewolf decision, see infra notes 151–87 and
accompanying text.
50. For a discussion of the impact of the Schonewolf decision, see infra notes
188–207 and accompanying text.
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Although sentencing judges have discretion to impose sentences they
feel are appropriate, such sentences can be arbitrary and disproportionate
given the number of factors judges are allowed to consider.51 To reduce
the likelihood of arbitrary or disproportionate sentences, Congress and
the Sentencing Commission provide guidance to judges.52 Additionally,
the Supreme Court and circuit courts provide guidance by interpreting
the laws and applying them to specific cases.53
A.

Support from the Legislative and Judicial Branches

Judges often look for legislative guidance on the proper considerations when imposing sentences.54 In response, the United States Sentenc51. See Thomas A. Zonay, Judicial Discretion: Ten Guidelines for Its Use, THE
NAT’L JUDICIAL COLL. (May 21, 2015), https://www.judges.org/judicial-discretionten-guidelines-for-its-use/ [https://perma.cc/8N3D-YEPR] (suggesting ten guidelines for judges to consider when exercising their sentencing discretion).
Proportionality in the realm of criminal sentencing is the idea that “the punishment should equal the crime.” See Mirko Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing: Its
Justification, Meaning and Role, 12 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 141, 142–46 (2000)
(detailing notion of proportionality in sentencing). Proportionality is an especially
important concept in sentencing because of the amount of discretion courts have
in imposing sentences. See id. at 159 (“Due to the large degree of discretion reposed in sentencers, sentencing law has been widely criticised as being unprincipled and lacking consistency, thereby compromising the fairness of the sentencing
process.” (citing MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER
(1973); Mirko Bagaric, Sentencing: The Road to Nowhere, 21 SYDNEY L. REV. 597
(1999)). Another key aspect of proportionality is that “[s]imilarly situated defendants are supposed to receive similar sentences.” See Eric Lotke, Sentencing Disparity
Among Co-Defendants: The Equalization Debate, 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 116, 116 (1993)
(discussing proportionate sentences amongst co-defendants and similarly situated
defendants).
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) (providing factors for judges to consider in
sentencing); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2018) (informing judges that rehabilitation cannot be sole basis for sentencing offender to imprisonment); An Overview of
the United States Sentencing Commission, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, https://isb.ussc
.gov/files/USSC_Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/A49T-XB8E] (last visited Jan.
31, 2019) (noting objectives of United States Sentencing Guidelines). These resources provide guidance from Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission. See id. (elaborating on guidance from Congress and Sentencing
Commission). For a discussion of guidance from Congress and the Sentencing
Commission, see infra notes 55–61 and accompanying text.
53. For a discussion of Supreme Court and circuit court cases that provide
further guidance, see infra notes 62–90 and accompanying text.
54. See § 3553(a) (enumerating factors for judges to consider, including deterrence, nature and circumstances of offense, protection of public, and need for
restitution); see also § 3582(a) (providing that rehabilitation cannot be sole basis
for sentencing offender to imprisonment). Some judges also consider whether the
defendant is eligible for specialty courts. See Federal Alternative-to-Incarceration Court
Programs, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, (Sept. 2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/de
fault/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2017/20170928_
alternatives.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AYP-EY3E] (discussing drug courts, specialty
courts, and diversionary programs that are available as options at sentencing).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol64/iss4/3

8

Booth: The Road to Recovery: The Third Circuit Recognizes the Importance

2019]

NOTE

577

ing Commission promulgated the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(USSG), which aim to advise judges and reduce sentencing disparities.55
When imposing a sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) directs courts to consider
“the need for the sentence imposed . . . to provide the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner . . . .”56 Additionally, 18
U.S.C. § 3582(a) clarifies that “if a term of imprisonment is to be imposed,
in determining the length of the term, [the court] shall consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a) . . . recognizing that imprisonment is not
an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.”57
In addition to these statutes, federal judges must also consider the
USSG before imposing a sentence.58 The United States Sentencing Commission designed the USSG to encompass the purposes of sentencing, provide certainty and fairness in sentencing, and reflect “advancement in the
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process.”59 Although the USSG are advisory—meaning judges are not re55. See Mission, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/about-page
[https://perma.cc/EQ3M-WPDC] (last visited Jan. 17, 2019) (noting Congress enacted Act that created Sentencing Commission). The Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 created the United States Sentencing Commission, which is an agency within
the judicial branch. See id. (providing brief history of Sentencing Commission
within United States government). The Commission’s primary purpose is “to establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal courts, including guidelines to be consulted regarding the appropriate form and severity of punishment
for offenders convicted of federal crimes . . . .” See id. (noting Sentencing Commission’s primary purpose). Additionally, the Commission serves two other purposes.
See id. (explaining Sentencing Commission has multiple purposes). First, the
Commission is “to advise and assist Congress and the executive branch in the development of effective and efficient crime policy.” See id. Second, the Commission
is “to collect, analyze, research, and distribute a broad array of information on
federal crime and sentencing issues, serving as an information resource for Congress, the executive branch, the courts, criminal justice practitioners, the academic
community, and the public.” See id.
56. See § 3553(a)(2)(D) (directing courts to consider multiple factors in imposing sentences). In pertinent part, section 3553(a) directs courts to consider
the nature and circumstances of the offense as well as the defendant’s history and
characteristics. See id. § 3553(a)(1)–(7) (naming factors related to defendant and
defendant’s history). Additionally, section 3553(a) requires that courts consider
the seriousness of the crime, how to deter additional crimes, the protection of the
public, and the educational, vocational, or medical needs of the defendant. See id.
(outlining factors related to purposes of punishment). Finally, section 3553(a)
outlines additional considerations, including policy statements and the sentence
recommended by the USSG. See id. (naming miscellaneous factors).
57. See § 3582(a) (elaborating on factors courts should consider in imposing
term of imprisonment).
58. See Federal Sentencing Guidelines, CORNELL LAW SCH., LEGAL INFORMATION
INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/federal_sentencing_guidelines [https://
perma.cc/TV3P-SM6F] (last visited Jan. 17, 2019) (noting that although USSG are
not mandatory, judges must consider them before sentencing and explain factors
leading to departure from USSG).
59. See An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 52 (discussing purpose of United States Sentencing Commission and objectives of United
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quired to follow them—if judges decide to impose either a more lenient
or harsher sentence than the one the guidelines recommend, they must
explain the departure.60
B.

The Sponsor: The Supreme Court

Apparent inconsistencies in the aforementioned statutes regarding
whether courts are permitted to consider the treatment needs of defendants prompted the Supreme Court to resolve the tension.61 In Tapia, the
Court interpreted the section of the Act that states courts should “consider
the factors set forth in . . . § 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable,
recognizing that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting
correction and rehabilitation.”62 The Tapia Court interpreted this section
to mean that courts “should acknowledge that imprisonment is not suitable for the purpose of promoting rehabilitation.”63 Consequently, the
States Sentencing Guidelines). The purposes of sentencing include “just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation.” See id. (specifying purposes of
sentencing).
60. See id. at 2 (explaining that judges must explain their logic for imposing
sentencing that deviates from Guidelines). Importantly, if a judge imposes a
guideline sentence, and the sentence is appealed, courts on appeal will assume the
sentence is reasonable. See id. (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007)).
Although the United States Sentencing Guidelines are advisory rather than
mandatory, this was not always the case; the Guidelines came into question in
2004. See Kelly Lyn Mitchell, What is Blakely and Why is it so Important?, UNIV. OF
MINN.: ROBINA INST. OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Mar. 16, 2015), https:/
/sentencing.umn.edu/content/what-blakely-and-why-it-so-important [https://per
ma.cc/GQ3Y-JVJF] (providing history of guidelines). In Blakely v. Washington, the
Supreme Court considered the validity of Washington’s sentencing guidelines, but
the Court’s decision also cast doubt upon the federal guidelines. See id. (citing
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)). Washington’s sentencing guidelines
allowed a court to impose a more severe sentence if it found “substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.” See id. (emphasis in original) (citing
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299) (explaining justifications for imposing more severe
sentences). The Blakely Court determined that the guidelines’ process “violated
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because the judge rather
than a jury made the findings that justified the higher sentence.” See id. (explaining Blakely Court’s holding). In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court considered the application of Blakely to the federal guidelines. See id. (citing United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). After Booker, “sentencing courts in the
federal system must consider the guidelines[’] ranges, but are permitted to tailor
the sentences as deemed appropriate, subject to appellate review for unreasonableness.” See id. (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 260–65) (explaining impact of Booker
decision).
61. See Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 326 (2011) (considering whether
courts can consider defendant’s rehabilitative needs when imposing sentence).
62. See id. (recognizing that section 3582(a) was at issue and outlining factors
courts should consider when sentencing to term of imprisonment).
63. See id. at 327 (determining that section 3582(a) instructs courts to acknowledge imprisonment is not appropriate means to promote rehabilitation).
The Court reached this conclusion by examining definitions for both “recognize”
and “appropriate.” See id. (discussing Court’s reliance on dictionary definitions of
recognize and appropriate). More specifically, the Court noted that recognize
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Court held the Act forbids a sentencing judge from imposing or extending a sentence in order to promote a defendant’s rehabilitation.64
Nevertheless, in reaching its holding, the Tapia Court recognized an exception that allows sentencing courts to urge defendants to receive treatment or even suggest specific rehabilitative programs to the defendant.65
C.

The Sponsee: Circuit Courts

Although the Tapia holding appeared relatively clear, it still sparked
disagreement amongst the circuits because the Tapia Court noted that
some discussion of rehabilitation may be permissible.66 In its wake, the
question became not whether a court can consider a defendant’s rehabilitation at sentencing, but to what extent can a court consider rehabilitation
at sentencing.67 The second question has proven far more difficult to
answer.68
Some circuits utilize a strict standard where any discussion of rehabilitation at sentencing violates Tapia.69 For example, in United States v. Vanmeans “to acknowledge or treat as valid.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1611 (2d ed.
1987)). Additionally, the Court determined that something is not appropriate
when it is not “suitable or fitting for a particular purpose.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 103 (2d ed. 1987)). Thus, the Court concluded that “a court making these
decisions should consider the specified rationales of punishment except for rehabilitation, which it should acknowledge as an unsuitable justification for a prison
term.” See id. (emphasis in original) (stating Court’s ultimate holding).
64. See id. at 332 (“And so this is a case in which text, context, and history
point to the same bottom line: Section 3582(a) precludes sentencing courts from
imposing or lengthening a prison term to promote an offender’s rehabilitation.”).
65. See id. at 334 (“A court commits no error by discussing the opportunities
for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training
programs. To the contrary, a court properly may address a person who is about to
begin a prison term about these important matters.”).
66. See Gornick, supra note 35 at 860–61 (2016) (recognizing confusion created amongst circuits because Tapia distinguished between acceptable and unacceptable discussion of rehabilitation).
67. See Madeline W. Goralski, Note, Let the Jude Speak: Reconsidering the Role of
Rehabilitation in Federal Sentencing, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1283, 1296–306 (2015)
(noting circuit courts may deliberate extent to which sentencing judges can consider rehabilitation before violating Tapia).
68. See id. at 1301–06 (outlining several different holdings that disagree as to
extent sentencing court can consider rehabilitation at sentencing).
69. See United States v. Joseph, 716 F.3d 1273, 1281 n.10 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding Tapia violation where rehabilitation “may have been a factor in the court’s
sentencing decision”); see also United States v. Thornton, 846 F.3d 1110, 1119
(10th Cir. 2017) (noting Tapia error where district court imposed sentence based
in part on rehabilitation); United States v. Spann, 757 F.3d 674, 675 (7th Cir.
2014) (finding Tapia violation where judge considered fact that defendant needed
enough time in prison to learn lawful work skills); United States v. Vandergrift, 754
F.3d 1303, 1311 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding Tapia error where district court considered rehabilitation to any extent in imposing sentence of incarceration). The
Thornton court elaborated on several questions surrounding Tapia violations. See
Thornton, 846 F.3d at 1113 (clarifying principles surrounding Tapia cases). Impor-
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dergrift,70 the Eleventh Circuit held that a court violates Tapia where it so
much as considers rehabilitation in imposing a sentence.71 In Vandergrift,
before the sentencing court imposed a sentence designed to benefit the
defendant, it merely mentioned the defendant’s likely mental health diagnosis and the possibility that he could receive vocational training in
prison.72 In outlining its reasoning, the sentencing court also cited other
sentencing factors it considered, including the seriousness of the offense
and deterring future misconduct.73 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted Tapia as precluding any consideration of rehabilitation whatsoever
in imposing a sentence.74
Likewise, in United States v. Thornton,75 the Tenth Circuit determined
that a court violates Tapia even where rehabilitation is one of many factors
tantly, even if rehabilitation is only one of several reasons the court uses to support
an imposition of imprisonment, a Tapia violation may still occur. See id. (noting
rehabilitation does not have to be sole rationale for sentence of imprisonment to
violate Tapia). Similarly, a court may violate Tapia even if it does not expressly tie
the term of imprisonment to a treatment program or opportunity. See id. at
1118–19 (explaining that a court may violate Tapia even if it does not explicitly
justify sentence of imprisonment with rehabilitation). Nevertheless, the Thornton
court clarified that a district court may discuss rehabilitation to rebut a defendant’s
argument that specific treatment opportunities would justify a lesser sentence. See
id. at 1117–18 (noting circumstance in which it would be appropriate for court to
mention defendant’s rehabilitation).
70. 754 F.3d 1303.
71. See id. (noting this holding is consistent with Tapia). The Eleventh Circuit
determined that its holding was consistent with Tapia because the Tapia Court
emphasized “that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tapia
v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 322 (2011)) (explaining Tapia’s justification for its
holding). More specifically, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the Tapia Court directed sentencing courts to “consider the specified rationales of punishment except
for rehabilitation, which it should acknowledge as an unsuitable justification for a
prison term.” See id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Tapia, 564 U.S. at 322) (providing Eleventh Circuit’s recitation of Tapia holding). Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
interpreted Tapia to preclude any consideration of rehabilitation when a court is
“determining whether to impose or lengthen a sentence of imprisonment.” See id.
(explaining Eleventh Circuit’s justification for its holding).
72. See id. at 1306 (noting mental health diagnosis and programs within
prison). In particular, the sentencing court acknowledged that the defendant
struggled with bipolar disorder, and stated that the prison system may be able to
help the defendant in that respect. See id. Moreover, the court recognized that the
defendant could benefit from vocational training programs within the prison. See
id.
73. See id. (discussing sentencing court’s reasoning for imposing sentence).
In outlining the reasons for its sentence, the court expressed a desire to promote
respect for the conditions of supervised release, reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect
the public, and to benefit the defendant. See id. (quoting sentencing court’s reasoning for Vandergrift’s sentence).
74. See id. at 1309–12 (noting Tapia Court’s reasoning for its holding).
75. 846 F.3d 1110 (10th Cir. 2017).
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a court considers in imposing a sentence of imprisonment.76 Specifically,
the sentencing court considered the defendant’s upbringing, lack of education, and need for remedial services.77 In another case, the Tenth Circuit determined the sentencing court violated Tapia when it considered
rehabilitation in tailoring the length of a sentence.78 Taking these cases
together, the Tenth Circuit applies a strict interpretation of Tapia by
which it considers rehabilitation in imposing a sentence of imprisonment
or determining the length of a sentence of imprisonment improper.79
In contrast, other circuits have determined that to constitute a Tapia
violation, the defendant’s rehabilitation must have been the primary or
dominant reason the court imposed a certain sentence.80 For example,
76. See id. at 1116 (determining that “[a] rule requiring reversal only when
rehabilitation is the sole motivation would not make sense” because “there will
almost always be some valid reasons advanced by the district court for imposing the
sentence issued”); see also United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1311 (11th
Cir. 2014) (explaining Tapia violation occurs where rehabilitation is sole reason
for imposing sentence); see also United States v. Spann, 757 F.3d 674 (7th Cir.
2014) (determining that sentencing court violated Tapia when it justified defendant’s sentence in part on potential for him to learn job skills).
77. See id. at 1113 (outlining multiple factors sentencing court considered in
imposing Thornton’s sentence). First, the sentencing court recognized that
Thornton needed services that would be available to him in prison. See id. (outlining major factor for Thornton’s sentence). Next, the sentencing court noted that
defendant was previously involved with gangs, and he had both juvenile adjudications and adult convictions. See id. (discussing defendant’s criminal history). Regarding the defendant’s family, his mother abandoned him, and he had a
challenging relationship with his father. See id. (addressing familial relationships).
Additionally, the court recognized that Thornton did not graduate high school but
went back to get his GED. See id. (elaborating on Thornton’s education). In summarizing the reasons for Thornton’s sentence, the sentencing court stated three
primary reasons: (1) community safety issues, (2) his history of rejecting efforts to
help him, and (3) “because I am firmly convinced that he needs enough time in prison to
get treatment and vocational benefits.” See id. (emphasis in original) (summarizing
reasons for sentence).
78. See United States v. Cordery, 656 F.3d 1103, 1106 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding error where district court imposed term of defendant’s imprisonment to ensure defendant’s eligibility for rehabilitative treatment program); see also United
States v. Deen, 706 F.3d 760, 769 (6th Cir. 2013) (vacating and remanding where
sentencing court wanted to give “Bureau of Prisons another chance to do some indepth rehabilitation with [defendant]” and imposed above-range sentence). In
Deen, although the USSG recommended sentence was four to ten months’ imprisonment, the sentencing court imposed a twenty-four-month sentence to give the
prison time to rehabilitate the defendant. See id. at 762 (stating recommended
sentence and sentence court imposed).
79. See Thornton, 846 F.3d at 1116 (determining that any consideration of rehabilitation in imposing imprisonment is improper); see also Cordery, 656 F.3d at
1106 (finding error where district court considered rehabilitation in determining
the length of imprisonment).
80. See United States v. Lifshitz, 714 F.3d 146, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding
court may discuss rehabilitative opportunities available within prison in imposing
sentence of incarceration); United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 195 (4th Cir.
2012) (declining to find Tapia violation where defendant’s repeated failure to
abide by conditions of supervised release rather than rehabilitation was reason for
sentence); United States v. Replogle, 678 F.3d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 2012) (declining
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the Fourth Circuit declined to reverse an alleged Tapia error where the
defendant’s potential rehabilitation was a minor part of the sentencing
court’s reasoning.81 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that if the sentencing
court’s mention of rehabilitative needs is only a fragment of the court’s
explanation for the sentence, the outcome of the proceeding has not been
altered based on a defendant’s rehabilitative needs.82 Similarly, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Lifshitz,83 declined to find a Tapia violation
where rehabilitation was not the lower court’s primary consideration in
crafting the sentence.84
to find Tapia violation where court considered whether defendant would be
“treated better somewhere else” in imposing sentence of imprisonment). See
Gornick, supra 35, at 856 (outlining methods circuits use in analyzing Tapia
claims).
81. See United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 201 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding no
reversible Tapia error where sentencing judge mentioned defendant’s need for
drug rehabilitation, but justified sentence based on defendant’s multiple crimes
during short period of freedom).
82. See id. at 196–97 (discussing sentencing court’s reasoning for Bennett’s
sentence). In many cases where a defendant challenges his or her sentence based
on a Tapia error, the claim has not been preserved properly. See id. at 200 (noting
Bennett failed to preserve his claim alleging Tapia error). As a result, the defendant has the burden to establish “plain error.” See id. (stating defendant’s burden
of proof where claim is not preserved). More specifically, to succeed, a defendant
must establish: “(1) that the district court erred; (2) that the error was ‘plain’; and
(3) that the error ‘affect[ed his or her] substantial rights,’ meaning that it ‘affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’ ” See id. (quoting United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (detailing elements of burden of proof)).
Notably, however, even if a defendant establishes the aforementioned elements,
the court still has the discretion to deny relief; importantly, denial is warranted if it
would not “result in a miscarriage of justice.” See id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 627 F.3d 941, 954 (4th Cir. 2010))
(identifying discretionary exception). As to the first prong regarding district court
error, in revocation proceedings, the court considers whether the sentence was
“plainly unreasonable.” See id. (citing United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437
(4th Cir. 2006) (detailing proper court reasoning). Reasonableness, however, is
also a multi-step inquiry. See id. (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)
(noting Gall is instructive for examining reasonableness of sentence). Under Gall,
the court first considers whether the sentencing court committed a significant procedural error. See id. (noting first question Gall instructs reviewing court to ask). If
there is no significant procedural error, the reviewing court should consider
whether the sentence is substantively reasonable. See id. (noting second question
Gall instructs reviewing court to ask). However, if the reviewing court finds either
error, the defendant is not automatically entitled to relief and the inquiry continues. See id. (noting extra step reviewing court may have to take). Instead, the
reviewing court must “decide whether [the error] is plainly unreasonable.” See id.
(citing United States v. Finley, 531 F.3d 288, 294 (4th Cir. 2008)) (identifying final
step)).
83. 714 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2013).
84. See id. at 150 (holding sentencing judge did not commit Tapia error where
judge mentioned defendant’s need for medical treatment but based sentence on
defendant’s continued violation of supervised release). The Second Circuit recognized that based on the sentencing colloquy, the “district court’s primary considerations in sentencing Lifshitz were ‘promoting respect for the law and protecting
the public from further crimes of this defendant.’ ” See id. at 150 (describing sen-
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Recently, the Third Circuit adopted the less rigorous approach and
determined that “the better reading of Tapia would only find error where
the record suggests ‘that the court may have calculated the length of [a
defendant’s] sentence to ensure that [the defendant] receive[s] certain
rehabilitative services.’”85 In doing so, the Third Circuit overruled its
prior decision in United States v. Doe,86 in which it held that section 3583,
the statute governing post-revocation sentencing, permits courts to consider medical and rehabilitative needs.87 Additionally, in United States v.
Zabielski,88 the Third Circuit declined to find a Tapia violation where the
sentencing court discussed rehabilitation as just one reason for imposing a
particular sentence.89
III. TOUGH TIMES MAKE TOUGH PEOPLE: THE FACTS
OF UNITED STATES V. SCHONEWOLF

AND

PROCEDURE

The facts underlying the Schonewolf decision are both tragic and reflective of the harsh reality of many criminal defendants.90 Janet Sonja
Schonewolf began smoking marijuana at age fourteen.91 By fifteen, she
dropped out of high school and left home.92 Additionally, Schonewolf
struggled with alcoholism and attempted suicide multiple times.93 Eventually, doctors diagnosed Schonewolf with bipolar disorder.94 Schonewolf
also struggled with crack cocaine and methamphetamine abuse.95
tencing court’s considerations). Further, although “the district court also considered Lifshitz’s need for medical care, there is no indication in the record that the
district court based the length of Lifshitz’s sentence on his need for treatment.”
See id. (recognizing sentencing court mentioned Lifshitz’s need for treatment, but
did not base length of sentence upon needed treatment). Instead, the sentencing
court based Lifshitz’s sentence on “ ‘continued disregard of the reasonable terms
and conditions of supervised release,’ which necessitated ‘a lengthy period of incarceration’ ‘to promote respect for the law and to protect the public from other
crimes of this defendant.” See id. (outlining sentencing court’s basis for imposing
Lifshitz’s particular sentence).
85. See United States v. Schonewolf, 905 F.3d 683, 692 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting
United States v. Tapia, 564 U.S. 319, 334–35 (2011)).
86. 617 F.3d 766 (3d Cir. 2010).
87. See Schonewolf, 905 F.3d at 687–90 (citing United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d
766 (3d Cir. 2010) (elaborating on Doe holding and reasoning); 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(g) (2018) (outlining procedures for post-revocation sentencing)).
88. 711 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 2013).
89. See Schonewolf, 905 F.3d at 693–94 (discussing Zabielski holding).
90. See id. at 684–85 (discussing Schonewolf’s circumstances, which parallel
those of many defendants within criminal justice system).
91. See id. at 684 (outlining facts).
92. See id. (discussing Schonewolf’s childhood).
93. See id. at 685 (noting beginning of Schonewolf’s drinking problem).
94. See id. (acknowledging Schonewolf’s mental health diagnosis).
95. See id. (elaborating on extent of Schonewolf’s addiction).
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Schonewolf began using opiates after doctors prescribed Percocet and a
fentanyl patch to help ease the pain of a back injury.96
Schonewolf’s first arrest occurred in 2010 after her father gave her
$88,000 and asked her to transport drugs from Nevada to Pennsylvania.97
When officers arrested her, she had about twelve pounds of
methamphetamine in the trunk of her car.98 She pleaded guilty and received a sentence of time served with an added sixty months of supervised
release, which represented a downward departure from the recommended
sentence under the USSG.99
Despite successfully completing years of supervised release,
Schonewolf relapsed and began using heroin.100 Officers caught her trying to purchase heroin, leading to new criminal charges.101 Because of
the new charges, Schonewolf violated the terms of her supervised release.102 Schonewolf’s probation officer filed the violation with the district court, but withdrew it because Schonewolf entered a detox
program.103

96. See id. (suggesting Schonewolf began using opioids only after being prescribed painkillers post-surgery).
97. See id. (outlining circumstances of Schonewolf’s first arrest).
98. See id. (stating weight of drugs Schonewolf transported).
99. See id. (noting procedure and resolution of Schonewolf’s first case). The
recommended sentence under the USSG was seventy-to-eighty-seven months’ imprisonment. See United States v. Schonewolf, Brief for Appellee, 2018 WL 1014780
(mentioning recommended sentence). When a court imposes a time served sentence, “the sentence is the same as the time the defendant has spent in jail, and the
defendant is set free.” See Time Served, CORNELL LAW SCH. LEGAL INFORMATION
INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/time_served [https://perma.cc/2KFLGVV4] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019) (citing Time Served, NOLO’S PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW
DICTIONARY (1st ed. 2009) (defining time served)). For example, if a defendant
spends eighteen months in prison while awaiting sentencing and is subsequently
sentenced to time served, the sentence is essentially an eighteen-month sentence.
See id.
100. See Schonewolf, 905 F.3d at 685 (recognizing circumstances that led to
Schonewolf’s rearrest).
101. See id. (outlining facts of Schonewolf’s second prior arrest).
102. See id. (noting interplay between Schonewolf’s first and second arrest).
Where an offender is on federal probation, the offender may violate their probation in multiple ways. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B
(2012) (outlining procedure and justifications for probation and parole violations). New criminal charges are a basis for revocation because of the notion that
offenders failed to abide by the court-imposed conditions of their supervision. See
id. (explaining why new arrests place individuals on probation in violation). In
other words, conditions of parole or probation generally include abstaining from
committing new crimes; consequently, if an offender engages in further criminal
activity, the offender violates the terms of probation or parole. See id. (elaborating
on which condition of probation committing new offense violates).
103. See Schonewolf, 905 F.3d at 685 (recognizing circumstances that led to
delayed violation hearing).
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Schonewolf eventually overdosed and left the detox program.104 As a
result, her probation officer re-filed the violation.105 During the revocation hearing, the government noted Schonewolf’s re-enrollment in a treatment program and progress within the program.106 The district court
sentenced Schonewolf to one day in prison and her pre-existing term of
supervised release.107
While Schonewolf was on supervised release, officers caught her selling heroin.108 She admitted that she had been doing so for six to seven
months, and she pleaded guilty to multiple drug charges.109 The court
sentenced Schonewolf to two to four years’ imprisonment.110 As a result
of her new case, Schonewolf’s probation officer again filed a violation with
the court.111
On August 15, 2017, Schonewolf appeared for the district court to
determine whether to revoke the period of supervised release on her first
case and impose a new sentence.112 At the time, the USSG recommended
a sentence of twenty-four to thirty months’ imprisonment.113 The government argued that Schonewolf should be sentenced to forty-eight months’
imprisonment because she received a lesser sentence during her last revocation hearing based on her promise to stop using drugs.114 In contrast,
Schonewolf argued for a twenty-four month sentence based on her history
of bipolar disorder, substance abuse, and the fact that her criminal activity
was nonviolent and solely to support her drug habits.115 Additionally, she
104. See id. (acknowledging that Schonewolf failed to complete her detox program due to overdose).
105. See id. (explaining how Schonewolf’s probation officer refiled violation
of supervised release).
106. See id. (outlining evidence before sentencing court).
107. See id. (noting specific sentence Schonewolf received). When someone
under supervision violates the conditions of his or her probation or parole, a probation officer reports the violation and offers a recommendation. See U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, Frequently Asked Questions, https://www.justice.gov/uspc/frequentlyasked-questions#q38 [https://perma.cc/NXF8-H8F2] (last visited Nov. 14, 2019)
(answering common questions regarding parole and probation). For example,
the probation officer might report the violation and then recommend that no
sanction be imposed. See id. (noting one option available to probation officers).
Nevertheless, the officer may recommend a sanction, such as a period of incarceration or revoking and restarting the term of supervision. See id. (noting option
wherein probation officers can recommend period of incarceration).
108. See Schonewolf, 905 F.3d at 685 (outlining circumstances of most recent
arrest).
109. See id. (elaborating on facts and procedure of Schonewolf’s most current
arrest).
110. See id. (stating Schonewolf’s sentence).
111. See id. (noting that probation officer filed second petition stating
Schonewolf violated her supervised release).
112. See id. (listing date of revocation hearing).
113. See id. at 686 (acknowledging sentence range recommended by
guidelines).
114. See id. (outlining government’s argument at revocation hearing).
115. See id. (discussing Schonewolf’s arguments at revocation hearing).
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emphasized that she already received a two-to-four-year sentence for her
new crime, which would give her time to complete treatment.116
The district court sentenced Schonewolf to forty months’ imprisonment to run consecutive to her state sentence.117 In imposing the sentence, the court stated “the last step we have in order to give you a fighting
chance to recover from whatever addictions you have . . . is to limit your
contact with the outside world for a significant period of time.”118 The
sentencing court also mentioned the fact that Schonewolf previously received a downward departure and that Schonewolf was a danger to herself
and society.119 Schonewolf appealed her sentence, arguing that the district court violated the Sentencing Reform Act by sentencing her to imprisonment to further her rehabilitation.120
IV. EASY DOES IT: A NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The Third Circuit began by reviewing Schonewolf’s claim—that her
sentence violated the Act—for plain error because she failed to preserve it
at sentencing.121 As the court explained, “to be entitled to relief under a
plain error standard, ‘a defendant must show: (1) error, (2) that is plain
or obvious, and (3) that affects a defendant’s substantial rights.’”122 Nevertheless, even if these elements are met, the court “may exercise its dis116. See id. (recognizing sentence for new charges).
117. See id. at 684 (noting sentence court imposed following revocation hearing). Consecutive sentences are those that are served one after the other. See Consecutive Sentence, CORNELL LAW SCH. LEGAL INFORMATION INST., https://www.law.cor
nell.edu/wex/consecutive_sentence [https://perma.cc/N82T-TYKG] (last visited
Jan. 17, 2019) (citing Consecutive Sentence, NOLO’S PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY
(1st ed. 2009)) (defining consecutive sentence). For example, if an offender “was
sentenced to two consecutive ten-year terms, the total sentence would be 20 years.”
See id. (providing example of consecutive sentencing). In contrast, a concurrent
sentence allows the sentences to be served simultaneously. See Concurrent Sentence,
CORNELL LAW SCH. LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/concurrent_sentence [https://perma.cc/R3UH-XDRM] (last visited Jan. 17,
2019) (citing Concurrent Sentence, NOLO’S PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed.
2009)) (defining concurrent sentence). Taking the above simplified example, if
the two-year sentences for simple assault and theft were concurrent, the offender
would only serve two years. See id.
118. See Schonewolf, 905 F.3d at 686 (quoting Transcript of Violation of Supervised Release Hearing at 21, United States v. Schonewolf, No. 2:13-cr-00037-JP-1
(E.D. Pa. 2017) (ECF No. 27) (identifying district court language that Schonewolf
argued violated Tapia).
119. See id. (recognizing other factors sentencing court considered).
120. See id. (reciting Schonewolf’s primary argument on appeal).
121. See id. at 686–87 (“[Schonewolf] did not raise this argument as an objection at her sentencing, and thus it is not preserved for appeal. “We review unpreserved claims for plain error.” (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Berry,
553 F.3d 273, 279 (3d Cir. 2009))).
122. See id. at 687 (quoting Berry, 553 F.3d at 279).
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cretion to grant relief, but only if ‘the error seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”123
Next, the Third Circuit determined that Tapia effectively overruled
the court’s prior decision in Doe, which held that partly basing the length
of post-revocation incarceration on a defendant’s need for drug rehabilitation is not a violation of the Act.124 Additionally, Schonewolf challenged
whether Tapia applies to sentences imposed at post-violation hearings,
such as Schonewolf’s revocation hearing.125 As the Supreme Court noted
in Tapia, the plain text of section 3582(a), which governs the court’s imposition of imprisonment, does not refer to the procedural posture of a
case.126 Instead, section 3582(a) merely states that imprisonment is not
an appropriate way to promote rehabilitation.127 Thus, because the Act is
not limited in application by its own terms, the Third Circuit held the
restrictions in Tapia apply to post-violation hearings.128
The Third Circuit also noted that the Tapia Court determined that
“Congress did not intend that courts consider offenders’ rehabilitative
needs when imposing prison sentences.”129 In reaching its conclusion,
the Tapia Court noted the lack of statutory provisions granting courts the
unfettered authority to ensure that defendants participate in rehabilitative
programs persuaded the Tapia Court.130 To illustrate, courts have the
statutory authority to order defendants to participate in certain rehabilitative programs as conditions of their supervised release; yet, courts do not
have a similar statutory authority when it comes to sentences of
incarceration.131
Additionally, the Third Circuit examined the existing circuit split surrounding Tapia.132 The court noted that one group of circuits utilizes a
stringent standard of review for Tapia claims where essentially every men123. See id. at 687 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467
(1997)).
124. See id. at 689–90 (recognizing Tapia overruled Doe). In sum, the Third
Circuit recognized that the Act, specifically section 3582(a), applies to revocation
sentences under section 3583(e) and section 3583(g). See id. (outlining reasoning
why Tapia overruled Doe). The Third Circuit determined that the reasoning the
Tapia Court used to reach its ultimate conclusion applies equally to post-revocation sentences. See id. (elaborating and simplifying court’s reasoning).
125. See id. at 690–91 (recognizing that sentences imposed following violation
hearings are similar to other sentences).
126. See id. at 690 (noting what statute does not include).
127. See id. (stating what statutory language precludes).
128. See id. at 689–91 (discussing court’s rationale).
129. See id. (recognizing limitations to conditions of sentence courts can impose) (citing United States v. Tapia, 564, U.S. 319, 331 (2011)).
130. See id. at 689 (noting Tapia relied on lack of statutory authority).
131. See id. (noting courts do have authority to order rehabilitative programming as condition of probation or supervised release, but no such statute exists
granting courts authority to order rehabilitative programming in conjunction with
imprisonment).
132. See id. at 690–91 (noting circuit split regarding standard to apply when
considering possible Tapia violation). For a discussion of the circuit split that de-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019

19

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 3

588

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64: p. 569

tion or consideration of rehabilitation is prohibited.133 The court also
recognized that another group of circuits holds that Tapia is violated only
if rehabilitation is the determinative factor for the defendant’s
sentence.134
The Third Circuit ultimately concluded that the second grouping of
circuits decided the issue correctly.135 In doing so, it noted that the Tapia
Court rejected the sentence because the sentencing court tailored it with
the goal of providing the defendant access to the prison’s drug abuse program.136 Following Tapia, the Third Circuit determined that a court violates the Act if it imposes or lengthens a sentence to further a defendant’s
rehabilitation.137 Importantly, however, courts may still mention or discuss a prison’s rehabilitative programs during sentencing.138 Consequently, the Third Circuit declined to hold that a sentencing judge merely
mentioning rehabilitation violates Tapia.139 The court stated that such a
holding is inconsistent with Tapia and “risk[s] a chilling effect on district
courts ‘discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison,’ a
subject that ‘a court properly may address.’”140
Finally, the court addressed Schonewolf’s arguments.141 Schonewolf
argued that the sentencing court’s “comments were addiction-centric and
veloped following the Tapia decision, see supra notes 67–85 and accompanying
text.
133. See id. at 691 (outlining circuits using strict standard wherein essentially
any mention of rehabilitation would constitute Tapia violation). In particular, the
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits apply a strict standard to Tapia
claims. See id. (listing strict circuits).
134. See id. (outlining circuits that apply more lenient standard wherein
courts can consider rehabilitation to certain extent without violating Tapia). The
First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits apply a more lenient standard to Tapia challenges. See id. (listing lenient circuits).
135. See id. at 692 (stating court’s belief that circuits that applied more lenient
standard correctly decided the issue). In siding with the circuits that adopted the
more lenient approach, the Third Circuit stated that it believed that approach
“tracks Tapia more closely.” See id. (stating reasoning for declining to follow more
stringent approach).
136. See id. at 692 (citing United States v. Tapia, 564 U.S. 319 (2011)) (noting
Tapia Court’s reasoning for its holding).
137. See id. (“[Tapia] is the paradigmatic example of how a District Court’s
sentence may violate the Act—when it is imposed or lengthened to provide the
opportunity to further a rehabilitative aim. Importantly, [Tapia] specifically left
open the door for a District Court to ‘discuss[ ] the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs.’ ”
(citing Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334)).
138. See id. (discussing Tapia).
139. See id. (restating prior determination that Tapia does not preclude any
mention of rehabilitation at sentencing).
140. See id. (citing Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334) (recognizing risk of “chilling effect”
on district courts if judges are prevented from considering or discussing
rehabilitation).
141. See id. at 692–93 (applying Tapia to facts of Schonewolf’s case).
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‘framed the choice [of sentence] in terms of treating her addiction.’”142
In particular, Schonewolf pointed to the court’s statement that it needed
to limit her access to the outside world to give her the opportunity to
recover from her addictions.143
The Third Circuit rejected Schonewolf’s arguments and determined
that the record as a whole showed that the sentencing court did not rely
on Schonewolf’s addiction or potential for sobriety when it determined
the appropriate sentence.144 Instead, Schonewolf’s increased sentence
was based on past leniency.145 Specifically, the Third Circuit noted that
the sentencing judge stated “I have decided to grant an upward variance.
And we take special note of the Application Note number . . . [four] which
points out . . . [past leniency] as a basis for an upward variance from the
range here.”146
In reaching its conclusion, the Third Circuit cited Zabielski, declining
to find a Tapia violation where statements did not “show that the District
Court imposed a longer sentence to ensure that [the defendant] received
the treatment that he needed.”147 Moreover, the Schonewolf court determined that the record did not show that the sentencing court imposed a
sentence of imprisonment or tailored the length of the sentence to allow
Schonewolf to participate in a particular rehabilitative program.148 As a
result, the Third Circuit held that Schonewolf’s sentence was not erroneous, and she failed to satisfy her burden of establishing plain error.149

142. See id. at 692 (outlining Schonewolf’s arguments on appeal).
143. See id. at 693 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 22–23, United States v.
Schonewolf 905 F.3d 683 (2018) (No. 17-2846), 2018 WL 486021 (3d Cir. 2018))
(identifying portion of district court’s reasoning for sentence that Schonewolf alleged violated Tapia). For the sentencing court’s quoted language, see supra note
118 and accompanying text.
144. See id. (evaluating Schonewolf’s arguments in light of the record as a
whole).
145. See id. (acknowledging main reason for Schonewolf’s sentence was past
leniency rather than rehabilitation).
146. See id. (quoting Brief for Appellant at 10, United States v. Schonewolf
905 F.3d 683 (2018) No. 17-2846, 2018 WL 486021 (3d Cir. 2018)) (identifying
portion of record where district court elaborated on its reasoning for the
sentence).
147. See id. at 693–94 (noting district court in Zabielski stated “one reason why
I think that incarceration at this point in time is necessary is the fact that you don’t
seem to be able to live up to the conditions that you need to maintain in order to
keep yourself sober on your medications” (quoting United States v. Zabielski, 711
F.3d 381, 391 (3d Cir. 2013))).
148. See id. at 694 (noting sentencing court did not impose longer sentence to
ensure Schonewolf received benefit of specific rehabilitation program).
149. See id. at 694 (stating court’s ultimate conclusion). For a discussion of
the circuits that utilize the more lenient approach, see infra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. For a discussion of different rehabilitation programs, see infra
notes 19–28 and accompanying text.
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PROGRESS, NOT PERFECTION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

In Schonewolf, the Third Circuit applied the less stringent Tapia interpretation in a manner that would satisfy the views of many, including several federal circuits and those who believe that rehabilitation can
successfully lower recidivism rates.150 Schonewolf committed a new crime
and previously received a downward departure, making the analysis less
complicated.151 Nevertheless, Tapia challenges in cases with different procedural and factual histories still present multiple obstacles, including a
seemingly impossible burden for defendants to meet.152 For example, a
court may hold a revocation hearing and resentence the defendant if the
defendant fails to successfully finish drug treatment.153 In these cases, the
purpose of incarceration may be less clear because the court is imposing a
sentence based solely on the defendant’s losing battle with addiction.154
A.

Don’t Lose Focus: Consider the Role, Not the Extent155

Courts are seemingly losing sight of the question they should be considering—what was the role of rehabilitation?156 In the wake of Tapia, the
question on appeal centers around the extent to which the sentencing
court considered rehabilitation.157 This complicates the analysis because
it is difficult to measure how much emphasis sentencing courts place on
rehabilitation, and it hints at the primary purpose and dominant factor
tests utilized by the more lenient circuits, both of which are not defined.158 Instead, courts should ask a simpler question: What role did rehabilitation have at sentencing?159
More specifically, courts should ask whether rehabilitation was a motivating factor for the sentence or whether the court was merely suggesting
150. See id. at 692 (applying less stringent approach and allowing court to
consider rehabilitation in part).
151. See id. at 685–86 (recounting previous downward departure and new
criminal activity).
152. For a discussion of the seemingly impossible burden that defendants
who do not preserve their claims are subject to, see infra notes 167–80 and accompanying text.
153. See United States v. Todd, 756 F. App’x 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2018) (considering Tapia violation where defendant’s only violation at issue during revocation
hearing was her failure to complete drug treatment).
154. See id. (imposing period of incarceration without new crime or other
violation).
155. I extend my sincere gratitude to Jacob Schuman, Esq., for his time and
help in simplifying this issue.
156. See Gornick, supra note 35, at 860 (discussing discrepancies in different
modes of analysis).
157. See id. (discussing application of primary purpose and dominant factor
tests).
158. See Goralski, supra note 68, at 1303–05 (discussing dominant factor test
without providing definition).
159. Contra id. at 1306–10 (advocating for courts to find Tapia error where
rehabilitation is mentioned at sentencing).
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that the defendant enroll in a rehabilitative program while in prison.160
This phrasing of the question simplifies the issue.161 Notably, the Tapia
Court carved out an exception that allows a court to urge someone to get
treatment or even suggest a specific rehabilitative program.162 Nevertheless, a court cannot consider rehabilitation as a justification for a sentence
of imprisonment.163 Consequently, instead of trying to evaluate the degree to which a sentencing judge considered rehabilitation by reading a
record, courts should focus on the role—mere advice versus reason for the
crafted sentence—that rehabilitation played.164 By applying this ap160. See Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 334 (2011) (recognizing that
courts may recommend different rehabilitative programming to defendants but
courts may not lengthen period of imprisonment to further rehabilitative goals).
The distinction between what is said and what is considered in Tapia may complicate an appellate court’s review. See Gornick, supra 35, at 861–62 (discussing possible trouble with distinguishing between what is considered or said). Notably, this
“distinction between thought and speech has ex ante value for a sentencing court
because it provides parameters for a judge’s ‘cognitive processes,’ i.e., her internal
decisionmaking.” See id. at 862 (footnote omitted) (explaining sentencing court
distinguishing between thoughts and spoken words may be valuable for sentencing
court at time of sentencing). On appeal, however, this distinction “has virtually no
ex post value” because the appellate court can only review “the sentencing hearing
transcript, which includes only what the judge said—not what she thought.” See id.
(recognizing distinction between thoughts and spoken words can be problematic
on appeal because appellate courts are limited to spoken words contained in
record).
161. See id. (discussing potential problems with distinguishing between what
judge says and what judge actually means). Unlike trying to distinguish between
what is said and what is meant to evaluate whether rehabilitation is considered,
focusing on the role of rehabilitation may simplify the issue. See id. at 860–62 (outlining disagreements and discrepancies among circuits). Rather than reading a
transcript to determine judge’s precise intent, considering the role itself may make
it easier to use context clues within the transcript. Contra id. (recognizing reviewing court is limited to the words in transcript and cannot discern judge’s precise
thoughts). For example, if the judge while imposing a sentence mentions a program the judge knows of that many similarly situated defendants have success with,
the role of the discussion of rehabilitation is merely a suggested program, which
Tapia allows. See Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334 (recognizing courts can suggest that defendants take advantage of certain programs). If, however, the judge says “I considered imposing a period of probation, but if I send you to prison you can
participate in XYZ Program, and I want you to do that,” or, “I was going to sentence you to one year in prison, but if I sentence you to a year and a half you can
participate in XYZ Program, so you are sentenced to a year and a half,” it is more
clear that the defendant’s rehabilitative needs are part of the reason for the specific sentence. See id. at 321 (recognizing extending length of sentence to allow
defendant to participate in certain rehabilitative program is improper).
162. See Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334 (“A court commits no error by discussing the
opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment
or training programs. To the contrary, a court properly may address a person who
is about to begin a prison term about these important matters.”).
163. See id. at 335 (“[A] court may not impose or lengthen a prison sentence
to enable an offender to complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote
rehabilitation.”).
164. Cf. id. (holding courts cannot impose sentence to enable defendant to
participate and complete rehabilitation program, but carving out exception for
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proach, sentencing judges can have a conversation about rehabilitation
and even recommend programming; however, they will be unable to use a
defendant’s rehabilitative needs to impose a sentence of imprisonment or
in determining the length of that sentence.165
B.

Be Realistic: Level the Playing Field

Moreover, the plain error standard of review for unpreserved claims
places an onerous burden on the defendant.166 Unfortunately, this means
that some instances where a sentencing court violates Tapia go uncorrected because defendants were unable to meet that burden.167 Shockingly, even if a defendant satisfies his or her burden, the court may still use
its discretion to decline to grant relief.168 This is because under the plain
error standard of review, meeting the elements does not end the inquiry;
instead, the court can only grant relief if it makes a second finding that
“the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.”169 Similarly, this burden may make it easier for
judges to circumvent the application of Tapia merely by omitting from the
record specific reasons for a sentence.170
A common suggestion to avoid the harsh standard that is applied to
unpreserved claims is to tell defendants to preserve their claims.171 In
merely recommending different rehabilitative opportunities that defendant
should consider). Tapia’s holding precluded courts from imposing or lengthening
a period of incarceration to allow defendants to enroll in and complete certain
rehabilitate programs. See id. (explaining purpose of Tapia holding). Yet, the
Court recognized an exception, which allows courts to recommend and suggest
rehabilitative programs with which they are familiar. See id. at 334–35 (recognizing
exception). The ultimate holding in conjunction with the exception lead to the
inference the Tapia Court focused on the role rehabilitation played and intended
for sentencing courts to do the same moving forward. See generally id.
165. See Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334–35 (noting courts cannot impose or lengthen
sentence of imprisonment based on rehabilitative needs, but courts can recommend and suggest certain programs).
166. For a discussion of why the plain error standard of review is especially
problematic in the realm of Tapia challenges, see infra notes 167–80 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., United States v. Thornton, 846 F.3d 1110, 1118–20 (recognizing
that district court erred when it sentenced Thornton but declining to find that
error was “plain”).
168. See United States v. Todd, 756 F. App’x 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding
Tapia violation but declining to grant relief).
169. See United States v. Schonewolf, 905 F.3d 683, 686–87 (3d Cir. 2018)
(quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)) (elaborating on set
of facts whereby court may deny relief even if defendant meets burden and establishes plain error).
170. See id. at 688 (reviewing record to determine existence of Tapia
violation).
171. See Namosha Boykin, Making Your Record and Preserving Issues for Appeal,
AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_law
yers/publications/tyl/topics/litigation/making-your-record-and-preserving-issues-
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practice as applied to Tapia challenges, this may look absurd.172 Imagine
that a judge discusses the defendant’s needs for rehabilitation when imposing a sentence.173 Defense counsel stands up and says: “Objection!
You relied heavily or completely on rehabilitation in sentencing my client.”174 Many judges would simply elaborate by providing other justifications for the sentence, effectively destroying the defendant’s appellate
claim.175 As a result, defense counsel face a lose-lose situation.176 First,
the defense counsel can choose not to object and limit the record to what
the judge said without further prompting, but on appeal the plain error
burden becomes nearly impossible to meet.177 Second, defense counsel
can object and have a lower burden on appeal, but give the judge the
opportunity to expound, which would lead to a record that even a lower
burden would likely not be able to overcome.178 As is, defendants face
two equally unappealing options: (1) leave their claim unpreserved and
face the plain error standard of review, or (2) create a record that would
be weak on appeal; thus, the reviewing courts should consider applying a
fairer standard of review.179
C.

Change is a Process, Not an Event

In order to level the playing field, a better way to view Tapia challenges may be through a legality of sentencing lens.180 Courts should utilize the Pennsylvania approach, where arguments alleging an illegal
appeal/ [https://perma.cc/W3US-TS6E] (using simple terms to instruct attorneys
how to preserve issues for appeal).
172. See id. (instructing attorneys to object during hearings to preserve specific issues for appeal).
173. See United States v. Thornton, 846 F.3d 1110, 1113 (10th Cir. 2017) (stating that defendant “needs all kinds of services that he can get and will get in prison” in
sentencing him (emphasis in original)).
174. See United States v. Tapia, 564 U.S. 319, 321 (2011) (holding that the Act
“precludes federal courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term in order to
promote a criminal defendant’s rehabilitation”).
175. See United States v. Schonewolf, 905 F.3d 683, 686 (3d Cir. 2018) (discussing other reasons for sentence including previous downward departure, behavior growing in severity, and danger to society).
176. See id. at 692–94 (finding sentencing court did not violate Tapia because
it imposed sentence based on more than just rehabilitation).
177. See Thornton, 846 F.3d at 1113 (noting plain error is standard of review
for unpreserved claims).
178. See United States v. Adams, 873 F.3d 512, 516–17 (6th Cir. 2017) (recognizing if claim is preserved standard of review for sentences imposed due to violations of probation or parole is abuse of discretion standard for reasonableness).
179. See Thornton, 846 F.3d at 1113 (noting unpreserved claims subject to
plain error review); see also United States v. Adams, 873 F.3d 512, 516–17 (6th Cir.
2017) (recognizing preserved claims subject to abuse of discretion standard for
reasonableness).
180. See generally MARK S. RHOADS, 5 ORFIELD’S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER
THE FEDERAL RULES § 35:19 (2d ed. Supp. June 2018) (discussing correctible illegalities in sentencing).
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sentence cannot be waived or unpreserved because the issue is a jurisdictional matter.181 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a), a court must acknowledge
that imprisonment is not an appropriate means to promote rehabilitation
and correction.182 If a court imposes a sentence that violates a statute, the
court is imposing a sentence that it does not have the statutory authority to
impose; thus, the court is sentencing outside of its jurisdiction.183
The burden for Tapia claims needs to be lower because if a court goes
beyond the bounds of its jurisdiction in imposing a sentence, the defendant should realistically be able to obtain relief.184 In sum, reviewing
Tapia claims through the legality of the sentence lens lowers the burden of
181. See generally, 26A CHRISTINE M. G. DAVIS ET AL., STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA
PRACTICE § 132:642 (2d ed. 2019) (outlining legality of sentencing approach that
Pennsylvania takes). In particular, Pennsylvania courts recognize that an illegal
sentence is void; consequently, the appellate issue surrounding its illegality cannot
be waived. See id. (explaining that claims that sentence is illegal are always preserved). In other words, “if a trial court does not have jurisdiction, it’s sentencing
decision is automatically subject to appellate review because the court imposing
sentence has exceeded the limits of its authority.” See id. (citing Commonwealth v.
Smith, 544 A.2d 991 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)) (explaining that illegal sentences involve jurisdictional issues). Additionally, Pennsylvania recognizes that one instance where a sentence is illegal occurs “when the sentence imposed is patently
inconsistent with the sentencing parameter set forth by the legislature.” See id.
(citing Commonwealth v. Succi, 173 A.3d 269 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (providing
example of illegal sentence). In the federal system, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 outlines remedies that apply when the court imposes a sentence it is not authorized to impose.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2018) (stating remedies in federal system). The federal system recognizes that there are some cases in which a court may impose an illegal
sentence, such as where the court imposes a sentence that is greater than the number of years allowed under the statute. See RHOADS, supra 180, at § 35:19 (providing example of where sentence would be illegal). Under Rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any
time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time
provided herein for the reduction of sentence.” See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (outlining
procedure for correcting or reducing a sentence).
182. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2018) (stating imprisonment is not effective or
permissible method of furthering rehabilitation).
183. Cf. Davis, supra note 181, at § 132:624 (noting sentence imposed without
statutory authority is sentence imposed without jurisdiction); see also id. (identifying source of violation); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2018) (noting certain prisoners may move for relief if sentence imposed violates Constitution). Specifically,
section 2255(a) states:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,
or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or
is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
See id. (explaining instance where prisoner can ask for relief based on claim that
sentence violates United States Constitution or federal law).
184. See id. (discussing remedies for court exceeding its jurisdictional or statutory authority); see also United States v. Adams, 873 F.3d 512, 516–17 (6th Cir.
2017) (noting standard of review for sentences imposed for violations of probation
or parole is abuse of discretion standard for reasonableness).
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proof for defendants and remedies the defense objection dilemma.185
This approach would make the defendant’s burden fairer and allow appellate courts to focus on what is truly important: whether a defendant was
unfairly sentenced in violation of a statute.186
VI. DON’T QUIT BEFORE

THE

MIRACLE HAPPENS

Although Schonewolf was not the first instance where the Third Circuit
considered a Tapia violation, it was the first time it expressly took a position in the circuit split.187 Following Schonewolf, district court judges will
be able to discuss rehabilitative options within prisons as well as a particular defendants’ struggles, including drug addiction and mental health.188
Doing so will allow judges to have a meaningful conversation with defendants, which will be beneficial even if the defendants are not ultimately
pleased with the sentence they receive.189 Importantly, however, courts
cannot rely on rehabilitation to impose a sentence of imprisonment.190
The Schonewolf decision may also cause states within the Third Circuit
to re-evaluate their own sentencing procedures.191 For example, the
185. See Adams, 873 F.3d at 516–17 (discussing abuse of discretion standard of
review).
186. Contra United States v. Thornton, 846 F.3d 1110, 1114 (10th Cir. 2017)
(reviewing Thornton’s claim under plain error standard).
187. See United States v. Schonewolf, 905 F.3d 683, 692 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[W]e
think the better reading of Tapia would only find error where the record suggests
‘that the court may have calculated the length of [a defendant’s] sentence to ensure that she receive[s] certain rehabilitative services.’ ” (quoting Tapia v. United
States, 564 U.S. 319, 334–35 (2011))).
188. See id. (noting Tapia “left open the door for a District Court to ‘discuss[ ]
the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Tapia, 564 U.S. at
334)).
189. See Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334 (noting courts can urge the Bureau of Prisons
to place a defendant in prison treatment program). Notably, section 3582(a)
states that a court can “make a recommendation concerning the type of prison
facility appropriate for the defendant.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2018) (explaining
courts can recommend certain prison facilities). This is because “the presence of a
rehabilitation program may make one facility more appropriate than another.” See
Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334 (recognizing certain facilities may be better equipped to
deal with defendant’s needs). As a result, courts that try to get offenders into
effective drug treatment programs do “something very right” as opposed to something wrong. See id. (discussing exception for when courts can discuss rehabilitation in imposing sentence of incarceration).
190. See id. (noting that if court does more than recommend programs within
facility it improperly considered rehabilitation in imposing sentence of
imprisonment).
191. See 42 PA. STAT. & CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9725(2) (West 1974) (allowing
courts to impose sentence of incarceration to allow defendant to receive treatment
within prison). Because Tapia does not allow courts to impose sentences of imprisonment to further rehabilitation, Pennsylvania’s statute appears to be in direct
violation; consequently, Pennsylvania may reconsider its own statute. Compare
Tapia, 564 U.S. at 333 (holding courts cannot impose or lengthen prison terms for
rehabilitative purposes), and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2018) (precluding incarceration
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Pennsylvania statute governing imprisonment allows for the imposition of
total confinement based on “the nature and circumstances of the crime
and the history, character, and condition of the defendant” if the court
believes that imprisonment is necessary because the defendant needs “correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by [the defendant’s] commitment to an institution . . . .”192 In light of Schonewolf,
Pennsylvania may amend the statutory language or add a clause with an
exception that notes rehabilitation cannot be the sole reason for a sentence of imprisonment.193
Similarly, a New Jersey statute recognizes one purpose of sentencing
is “[t]o promote the correction and rehabilitation of offenders . . . .”194
Importantly, however, New Jersey has a separate statute that lists aggravating and mitigating factors courts must consider before imposing a sentence of imprisonment.195 This statute omits rehabilitation as an
aggravating or mitigating factor, and it does not state whether courts can
consider factors that are not listed.196 To clarify whether a court can or
should consider rehabilitation as a general purpose of sentencing when
imposing sentences of imprisonment, New Jersey should amend its statutory language.197
Currently, most inmates struggle with substance use disorders and
mental illness.198 Moreover, many inmates have never received a formal
education or job-training.199 These underlying struggles are what cause
to further rehabilitation), with 42 PA. STAT. & CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9725(2) (allowing incarceration to further rehabilitation).
192. See 42 PA. STAT. & CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9725 (providing sentencing courts
in Pennsylvania with factors to consider at sentencing).
193. See United States v. Schonewolf, 905 F.3d 683, 692 (3d Cir. 2018) (recognizing that Tapia allows courts to discuss rehabilitative opportunities). Compare 42
PA. STAT. & CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9725(2) (allowing incarceration for purposes of
rehabilitation), with Tapia, 564 U.S. at 333 (holding courts cannot impose or
lengthen prison terms for rehabilitative purposes), and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (forbidding courts from imposing incarceration to allow for rehabilitation).
194. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-2(b) (West 2014) (listing “general purposes of
the provisions governing the sentencing of offenders”).
195. See id. § 2C:44-1 (providing factors courts must consider before imposing
sentence of imprisonment).
196. See id. (failing to list rehabilitation as factor but excluding subsection to
clarify whether court may consider it as general purpose).
197. Compare id. § 2C:1-2(b) (noting rehabilitation is a purpose underlying
the sentencing provisions), and id. § 2C:44-1 (listing factors courts must consider
before imposing imprisonment but failing to clarify whether courts can consider
rehabilitation generally at sentencing), with Tapia, 564 U.S. at 333 (holding courts
cannot impose or lengthen prison terms for rehabilitative purposes), and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(a) (precluding courts from imposing incarceration to allow for
rehabilitation).
198. For a discussion of the prevalence of substance use disorders and mental
illness among inmates, see supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text.
199. For a discussion of the educational and vocational needs of inmates, see
supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text.
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many offenders to resort to criminal activity.200 Although the criminal
justice system and courts need to address the rehabilitative needs of offenders, locking up offenders solely for the purpose of facilitating treatment is not a valid reason for a sentence of incarceration.201 As a result,
Tapia and Schonewolf are important cases that draw a necessary line between the permissible and impermissible discussion of rehabilitation at
sentencing.202
Moving forward, many courts and legislatures will need to adjust their
sentencing methodology and statutes in order to ensure compliance with
Tapia.203 In doing so, they should focus more on the role rehabilitation
played at sentencing and less on the extent to which a court considers
rehabilitation.204 Alternatively, because a court that imposes a sentence of
incarceration for rehabilitative purposes exceeds its statutory authority, appellate courts should evaluate Tapia claims as though they are challenges
to the legality of the sentence, subjecting the appellant to a lower, more
realistic burden of proof.205 Although these distinctions may seem minor,
they are crucial for someone who is facing a period incarceration solely
because of their losing battle with addiction or mental illness.206

200. See Incarceration, Substance Abuse, and Addiction, supra note 2 (explaining
that 63–83% of defendants are under influence of drugs when arrested); see also
Harlow supra note 6 (citing Grant Duwe, An Outcome Evaluation of a Prison Work
Release Program: Estimating Its Effects on Recidivism, Employment, and Cost Avoidance, 26
CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 531 (2015) (noting that job-training programs, specifically
work release decreased rearrests by 16%, reconvictions by 14%, and new offense
reincarceration by 17%)).
201. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2018) (noting imprisonment is not permissible
means of promoting rehabilitation).
202. See Tapia, 564 U.S. at 333 (noting courts may discuss opportunities for
rehabilitation or benefits of certain programs but holding that courts cannot impose or lengthen prison terms merely because they think offenders will benefit
from prison treatment programs); United States v. Schonewolf, 905 F.3d 683, 692
(3d Cir. 2018) (recognizing that Tapia allows courts to discuss rehabilitative
opportunities).
203. For a discussion of how Pennsylvania may have to amend its sentencing
scheme, see supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text.
204. For a discussion on why courts should consider the role of rehabilitation
in sentencing, see supra notes 157–66 and accompanying text.
205. For a discussion of the appellant’s burden under the plain error standard of review and how utilizing a legality of the sentence approach may fix the
issue, see supra notes 167–80 and accompanying text.
206. See United States v. Thornton, 846 F.3d 1110, 1118–19 (10th Cir. 2017)
(determining sentencing court violated Tapia because it sentenced Thornton to
prison to give him enough time to get treatment and vocational benefits but declining to grant relief under plain error standard of review).
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